Introduction
The Enlargement to embrace the CEE10 would raise the land mass of the EU by 33 percent, the EU population by 105 million (28 percent), and EU GDP (evaluated at purchasing power parity, or PPP) by 11 percent. The population increase compares to the 1973 enlargement of 31 percent. The GDP increase of 11 percent compares to the 1986 enlargement of 12 percent, and the land mass increase compares to each of the previous enlargements. A major difference in the recent enlargement, however, is the much lower level of development of the CEEC10 countries. The per capita PPP-based GDP of these countries is 39 percent of that of the EU-15, compared to an equivalent figure of 61.5 percent for the much smaller accessions (in population terms) of the 1980s. By contrast, the enlargements of the 1970s and 1990s barely affected average incomes.
The economic effects on incumbents of these earlier enlargements pale in comparison to the likely consequences of the accession of the CEEC10, because of this large income difference, and because of the size of the agricultural sector in Central and Eastern
Europe. Enlargement will double the number of EU farmers and increase the area under agricultural production by one-third. These structural differences have led to hard bargaining over how the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds programmes will be extended to the new accession countries, with incumbents battling to keep down the budgetary costs of enlargement. While the budgetary implications loom large in the general European policy debate, however, the welfare consequences over the longer term are likely to be dominated by the increased trade and factor flows to that enlargement will give rise to.
Because of the relative sizes of the two groups of economies, the economic effects of enlargement will be much more profound for the CEEC10 than for any of the previous enlargements. Amongst the older incumbents, the strongest aggregate-demand and immigration effects at least are likely to be felt by the Western states that border the CEEC.
Enlargement will nevertheless have important implications for Ireland. It will open up
new opportunities for Irish businesses in exporting, outsourcing and outward foreign direct investment (FDI). Ireland's foreign-owned sector will also benefit from the expansion of trade, though the environment in which the country competes for inward FDI will become more competitive. Enlargement will also open up the possibility of labour migration from CEE countries. Most of the EU15 member states are likely to phase this in over a 7-year transition period, on the assumption that continuing convergence in living standards between the CEEC and the EU15 will reduce the desirability of migration. This paper deals with each of these issues in turn. Section 2 considers the trade effects and assesses the opportunities afforded by enlargement for outsourcing and outward investment. Section 3 considers the implications for Ireland's foreign-owned sector and for the country's ability to continue to attract technologically-advanced foreign industry.
Section 4 analyses the likely pattern of migration flows and its consequences, and Section 5 assesses the implications of enlargement for the EU budget and the Irish exchequer.
The final Section summarises the paper and draws together the conclusions.
Trade, Outsourcing and Outward FDI
Ireland currently trades over 40 times as much with the rest of the EU as it does with the CEEC10, as shown in The growth in trade is also of interest. Table 2 shows that Irish exports to the CEEC have grown more than 40-fold over the 1990s, while imports have grown even more rapidly. 1 This suggestion of a possible doubling of trade with CEE countries is very close to that predicted by Brulhart and Kelly (1999) . They estimate a gravity model that takes account of trade barriers represented by distance and non-EU membership and use it to predict the effects of enlargement on trade. Predicted effects are much larger if partial income convergence of the CEECs on the EU is also allowed for. They caution however that any expansion is from a relatively low base. At present Ireland-CEE trade (the sum of exports and imports) comes to a little over 1 percent of Irish GDP.
Irish trade relations with the region have expanded much more strongly than have the UK's for example, as the table also illustrates. Trade liberalisation of course has sectoral as well as aggregate implications, which is the issue to which we now turn. Most bilateral tariffs on manufacturing trade between the EU and CEEC have already been removed under the terms of the Europe Agreements, though impediments to trade in agriculture and food processing remain. Accession will liberalise this dimension of trade and lead to the harmonisation of external tariffs. It will also allow the CEE countries access to the Single European Market.
The customs union dimension, it is generally agreed, will lead to the expansion of the food processing sector in CEE countries at the expense of food processing in the EU15; Francois and Rombout (2001) , Lejour et al. (2001) . The mechanisms generating this prediction are as follows. Current EU export subsidies are larger than for the CEEC.
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Removal of export subsidies between the two sets of states will reduce EU15 exports to the CEEC. A reduction in the higher CEE external tariff on agricultural imports will increase the competitiveness of the CEE food processing sector, while the removal of EU tariffs on CEE products is anticipated to increase CEE exports to the EU15. 4 We deal below with the precise implications these developments might have for the Irish food processing sector.
The second trade effect comes about as a result of CEE accession to the Single Market.
Since this entails fiercer competition on firms' home markets while enhancing firms' competitiveness on foreign markets, it will typically be beneficial for sectors that are already export-intensive. All studies to date agreed that CEE sectors such as textiles, clothing and footwear stand to benefit, generally to the detriment of the Southern EU member states. The major sector to expand among the EU15 is predicted to be Machinery and Equipment, in which the EU currently has a strong trade surplus with the CEEC. This will be further expanded by increased investment levels in the new EU member states.
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Studies disagree on the implications for the motor vehicles and transport sector, with some such as Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) suggesting that this sector will expand in the EU15 while others such as Lejour et al. (2001) suggest that it will contract.
Prediction is made more difficult by the fact that the Transport Equipment sector in the CEEC has been developed in recent years behind high tariff barriers, which will obviously disappear as a consequence of enlargement; Barry (2002) . There is evidence, however, that carmakers are currently moving from Spain to Central Europe.
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How will the individual EU incumbent countries fare according to this preliminary analysis? The effects will depend on the importance of these individual sectors in each incumbent country. To surmount transfer-pricing problems we evaluate this in employment terms. The data in Table 3 show the importance of each of these sectors in each country's manufacturing employment relative to the sector's importance in overall EU manufacturing employment. 7 Each cell therefore measures, for sector i and country j, 5 The material in this paragraph is based on Lejour et al (2001) and Baldwin et al. (1997) .
6 "Carmakers up sticks for eastern Europe"; Financial Times, October 10, 2002.
7 These data depict averages over the years 1995-97, the latest years for which the Daisie database gives data for the entire EU.
(L ij /L j )/(L i /L EU ). We will refer to these as measures of a country's "revealed comparative advantage".
8 Table 4 . These adjustments show that indigenous industry has a stronger presence than foreign industry in the EU sectors predicted to do badly, and has a weaker presence in the heavy capital goods sector that analyses are agreed is the EU sector that is likely to do best as a consequence of enlargement.
The international analyses from which the above sectoral predictions are drawn do not consider the specific circumstances of the various EU incumbents but instead treat them as a single group. One important point can be made about Ireland's food processing sector however, which is, in employment terms, both the most important indigenous
Irish case, and also to allow us distinguish later between Ireland's indigenous and foreign sectors. It can be surmised therefore that Irish and CEE food processing are not in direct competition. The output of the Central European EU incumbents, on the other handcountries such as Germany and Austria and to a lesser extent France -is similar to that of the CEE countries. This is confirmed by Ferto and Hubbard (2001, page 6 ) who show that Irish-Hungarian trade in agri-food products is primarily inter-industry, as is Hungary's food trade with Italy, Spain and Greece, while that between Hungary and Austria, the Netherlands, France and Germany is primarily intra-industry. While the Irish sector may suffer alongside other EU incumbents by having export subsidies withdrawn, therefore, the growth of the CEE sector will not damage the Irish sector nearly as much as it will certain other EU states. In fact, if accession yields the expected growth benefits to the CEE countries, Irish food processing appears well-positioned to gain.
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The conventional predictions that EU15 Food Processing and the Textiles, Clothing and Footwear sectors will suffer also ignores the possibility of strategic responses on their part. We now briefly consider these issues -focusing first on outward FDI and then on outsourcing -again with a particular focus on Ireland. Source: Barry, Gorg and McDowell (2002) from UNCTAD (2000) and CFM Capital Acquisitions Survey (various years).
Irish firms have clearly developed valuable proprietary assets in management skills, experience and reputation in these sectors, and should be well-positioned to develop these 12 For more on this see Barry, Gorg and McDowell (2002) . 13 This sector comprises Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Precision Instruments.
assets further in the expanding markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Table 6 indicates that they have already begun to do so. Nor is enlargement necessarily detrimental to the EU15 Textiles and Clothing sector,
given the possibility of outsourcing to CEE countries. Outsourcing entails splitting up the production process and importing intermediates which had formerly been sourced domestically. This process allows for increased specialisation, generating further gains from trade liberalisation. Austria's proximity to the CEE candidate countries means that outsourcing has advanced particularly rapidly in its case, and it has been found to be particularly important in less skill-intensive sectors including Wood Products and Textiles; Egger et al. (2001) . 14 They find it to have been an important source of total factor productivity growth in these sectors, though overall welfare effects depend on the extent of labour-market flexibility in the outsourcing countries since it can otherwise lead to unemployment. Other studies such as Anderton and Brenton (1999) find that outsourcing leads to an increase in both the wage-bill share and the employment share of skilled workers in companies located in the countries engaged in outsourcing. It therefore represents a step upwards on the ladder of comparative advantage.
Implications for Inward FDI
Enlargement will considerably enhance the attractiveness of the CEE countries as a location for export-oriented foreign direct investment, and as such will allow them compete more strongly for such investments. This will arise even though there is already almost complete free trade in manufactures between the EU and the CEEC. Will Ireland compete directly with the CEE countries for foreign investment? There is some possibility that this could arise. A number of them have followed Ireland's lead in offering low rates of corporation tax, and the more advanced ones do not differ substantially from Ireland in terms of the skill levels of the population, while labour costs in CEE countries are very much lower. Furthermore, the productivity level of the workforce is arguably endogenous, reflecting success or failure at attracting FDI, rather than an exogenous factor that determines the likelihood of success or failure in this regard. Upon accession, several at least of the CEE countries will have equally easy access to the high-income markets of Western Europe, a factor that is of particular importance for some industries according to the analysis of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) . 15 A subset of these are likely to enjoy equally stable macro policy environments and equivalent regulatory and public administration systems.
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This opens up the possibility that they might compete directly with Ireland for the type of FDI that Ireland has been successful in attracting thus far; Barry and Hannan (2001) .
As against this however, previous episodes of trade liberalisation in Europe have increased the pool of FDI both from within Europe and from outside; Dunning (1997a Dunning ( , 1997b . The goods produced by multinational firms also tend to have relatively high income elasticities of demand so that the expected growth in the CEEC10 consequent on enlargement should generate further flows of FDI into and within the newly expanded EU; Barry and Hannan (2002b) . A further relevant detail is that the Single Market liberalisation was associated with an expansion in the average number of plants that the leading multinational firms in the EU maintained. Among such firms with plants in
Ireland for example, the average number of EU countries other than their home bases in which they maintained plants rose from 3 in 1987 to 5 in 1993; Pavelin (2000) . This
suggests that the development of the Single Market was associated with a further fragmentation of the production chain. If this proves to be the case it will be efficiencyenhancing and should operate to the further benefit of Ireland's foreign-owned industry.
What is the evidence on this so far? Some indications can be gleaned from an analysis of Ireland's trade linkages with CEE countries in the sub-sectors of Irish manufacturing that 15 Transport infrastructure plays an important role in calculations of a country's centrality or "closeness to purchasing power". Schürmann and Talaat (2000) provide a recent ranking of EU and CEE countries in this regard. Their index is based on a measure of travel costs between points within the overall region weighted by the purchasing power that each point represents. The most peripheral regions at present, they find, are the Baltic states, Northern Sweden and Finland, and Bulgaria and Romania. Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech and Slovak Republics and the southwest corner of Poland are no more peripheral than Ireland, Spain or Portugal, and less peripheral than Greece. Interestingly, these authors also present a projection for the year 2016 based on the assumption of EU accession (with its associated reduction in border delays) and the implementation of current transport infrastructure plans for Central and Eastern Europe and EU incumbents. In this scenario, some regions in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Eastern Germany and Portugal move ahead of Ireland, with Greece left even further behind. 16 The macroeconomic environment will of course be heavily constrained by adherence to the Maastricht criteria. Fodors et al. (2002) Table 8 , while the equivalent position for 1990 (for sectors trading more than £100 million at the time) before the Hungarian computer sector began to develop was as illustrated in Table 9 . 
Migration Issues
Enlargement brings with it the possibility of substantial migration flows from CEE countries to the EU15. Most studies that have been carried out suggest however that the inflow of migrants will in fact be quite modest for countries other than Germany and Austria, and that even in these latter countries the economic effects will not be substantial. Nevertheless, the EU incumbents generally favour only a gradual opening up of labour markets, in the knowledge that ongoing convergence in living standards will make migration a less desirable option. There is indeed a precedent for such a transition 20 One such is to increase densities considerably by easing height restrictions in new housing developments, and to build up state-owned land banks purchased at non-rezoned agricultural-use prices; see e.g. Drudy (2001) .
The percentage of the population of the CEEC10 of employable age is generally higher than is the case for Germany, current unemployment rates are rather similar, and income and wage differences are of course large. Studies generally find that the largest emigration rates can be expected from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, mainly because of their relatively high income disadvantages. Of these, the Poles are generally better prepared for emigration, in terms of educational qualifications and access to emigrant networks. Consensus estimates suggest that no more than 3 million Central and Eastern
Europeans will migrate to Western Europe over the next 15 to 20 years. This would comprise 1 percent of the EU population and 2 to 3 percent of the CEEC population.
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Studies indicate a maximum of 335,000 immigrants to the West in the first year, falling to an annual flow of 100,000 in the medium term, based on an assumed convergence of 2 percent per annum between CEE10 and EU income levels and no strong changes in unemployment differentials. Most of these inflows, furthermore, will go to Germany and Austria, which are the end location for over 80 percent of CEE migrants at present. tends to be concentrated among the less skilled. The net fiscal costs of immigration will also be larger as unskilled immigrants use more government services and pay less tax.
All of these effects are reversed of course if immigrants are more highly skilled than the indigenous population, though it must be noted that immigrants frequently work in occupations that do not fully employ their qualifications. The studies cited above suggest that these effects on EU15 labour markets, whether positive or negative, will all be small, because of the modest increase in population size
envisaged. There will also be a modest drop in the EU15 terms of trade because of the expansion of output that immigration will generate. Several studies suggest that German GDP per head would fall by only 0.8 percent even if all CEE immigrants were low skilled.
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23 By contrast Boeri et al (2000; part A, page 127) , the most widely cited study on the immigration implications of enlargement, predict the stock of CEE resident in Ireland to rise from a figure of 200 that they quote for 1998 to a total of 900 by 2030! 24 Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) ; Lejour et al. (2001) .
These studies, understandably, do not focus much attention on Ireland, given that they do not predict substantial flows of workers into this country. Immigrant flows into the Irish labour force over the 1990s are known to have been relatively highly skilled, however.
Suggested reasons for this include the fact that more highly educated people will have more information about Ireland as a destination, and relatively high income inequality levels may attract a higher ratio of skilled workers. The skill mix in turn has been found to have contributed to the slowdown in earnings inequality growth. 25 One can only speculate as to whether this same skill mix will continue to prevail upon EU enlargement.
One finding from Germany that may be of interest however, given current cost over-runs in implementing the National Development Plan, is that temporary migration possibilities afforded to CEE construction workers were found to have increased competition substantially in the sector through increased subcontracting to CEEC firms; Boeri et al.
.
Macroeconomic and Budgetary Issues
Some commentators have suggested that the scale and effects of the CEEC10 enlargement can be gauged by reflecting on the experience of German reunification, implying that enlargement might involve substantial deficit spending and rising interest rates. This is most unlikely to happen because the scale of budgetary support offered will be much less than in the case of German reunification.
Most analyses carried out previous to the Copenhagen agreement of December 2002
arrived at an estimated net cost of enlargement to the EU budget of around 20 billion euro per annum. Thus Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) assume that Structural Funds expenditures will be capped at 5 percent of CEE GDP, and that average CAP payments to CEE farmers are equivalent per hectare (rather than per person) to those paid to EU farmers (which with low CEE productivity reduces the cost substantially). Summing these costs and subtracting a contribution of 1 percent of candidate countries' GDP 25 Barrett et al. (2002) . It is important to note however that regardless of agreements reached in the near future over reform of the CAP and Structural Funds programmes, further renegotiations will occur in the wake of EU enlargement. Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) offer some speculations as to the voting coalitions likely to emerge at this time.
2006 to avert this possibility, and to include as well a special lump-sum cash-flow facility which granted Poland 1 billion euro which had been originally designated as structural funds. Unlike in the case of structural funding this amount would be transferred immediately to the Polish budget, it can be spent at will, and will avoid the co-financing requirement associated with structural funds expenditures. These various figures are presented in Tables 11a and b.   28 The Copenhagen agreement represents a considerably better deal for incumbent EU members than had long been anticipated. Rather than the 20 billion euro per annum estimate of Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) The temporal dimension to these issues also needs to be borne in mind. CAP payments are set to rise gradually, while Structural Fund allocations, at a little over 1 percent of CEE GDP, are small in comparison to the allocations made to the Cohesion countries and might also therefore be expected to rise over time. On the other hand, CEE countries are likely to be converging on the EU15 in terms of income per head over this period, which will reduce the need for transfers.
While the EU has taken great care to ensure that the budgetary and interest rate costs of enlargement are tiny compared to those entailed by German reunification, an EU-wide fiscal expansion, were it to arise at some time in the future, would nevertheless exert upward pressure on interest rates, as could moves to hasten the entry of the candidate 31 See Matthews (2001) .
countries into EMU. We complete this section by looking at the sectoral implications for the Irish economy of such possible macroeconomic developments.
In its report on the economic implications for Ireland of participation in EMU, ESRI (1996) identified certain sectors of the Irish economy that are particularly vulnerable to high interest rates. Such vulnerability was argued to depends both on product characteristics and on industrial structure. Durable goods, occasional purchases, housebuilding materials and construction are all likely to be quite sensitive for example, while firms in low-margin sectors or with high levels of indebtedness will also be particularly It is noteworthy that these are all low-technology sectors and all have declined as a share of manufacturing (and total) employment since the ESRI study was carried out. This suggests that Irish manufacturing employment is now less vulnerable to high interest rates, even if these should arise in the future as a consequence of enlargement, than was the case even a decade ago.
Conclusions
Enlargement will have important economic implications for Ireland. Trade expansion for example seems certain. Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) estimate that Ireland will receive 0.3 percent of the total gains from trade accruing to the EU15.
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Most Irish export sectors will gain. The Western European sectors threatened by enlargement are generally agreed to include Food Processing and Textiles, Clothing and Footwear. Our analysis suggests that the Irish food processing sector is in fact likely to gain, as it produces a very different range of products from those into which the CEE countries will specialise. We expect that Irish companies in this and a number of other sectors will, on the basis of proprietary assets in management and sectoral experience, engage in outward 32 They estimate the EU15 gain at a modest 11.2 billion ecu (at 1992 prices). Enlargement will also open up the possibility of labour migration. Most studies estimate that inflows will be quite modest, summing to perhaps 1 percent of the EU15 population by the year 2030. The vast majority of these migrants will go to Germany and Austria.
The impact on wages and living standards will depend on the skills of the migrants, but if inflows are as modest as studies suggest, these effects will be fairly negligible.
Finally, we looked at the macroeconomic and budgetary implications of enlargement.
The annual cost to the Irish Exchequer in the early years is likely to lie closer to the 90 than the 200 million euro figures discussed in the text. A root and branch review of the distribution of the EU budget could cost the country up to 2 billion euro per annum, reflecting the extent to which the country is oversubsidised at present relative to its income level. Even if the narrowly-defined economic benefits for EU incumbents turn out to be quite modest it is important to remember, as Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) point out, that the outcome of the narrow economic calculus employed here pales into insignificance when evaluated against the larger implications of enlargement.
Eastwards expansion of the EU is primarily about the security and stability of the continent and the reconstruction of Europe's post-Cold War political architecture.
